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GATT AND NAFTA
PANEL DISCUSSION
AUDIENCE MEMBER: For Emery Simon, do you see a
problem with the cultural exception provision1 that is going to be
in NAFTA, and is there any particular reason why it is in the
Agreement? I assume that we weren't able to negotiate it out.
Will it be a problem?
MR. SIMON: The cultural exception in the NAFTA is essen-
tially a duplication of the cultural exception under the U.S.-Cana-
dian Free Trade Agreement.2 It's an unfortunate aberration. In
fact, it was one of the last issues settled in the NAFTA negotia-
tions.
The cultural exception really was a very difficult political deci-
sion for the Canadians. There were two or three Canadian minis-
ters who didn't want it and there were several ministers who felt
that they had made a promise to the Canadian people not to negoti-
ate anything less than what they had gotten from the U.S.-Canadian
Free Trade Agreement, and they felt totally boxed in by it.
There was another dimension to it that was kind of unfortunate:
the EC dimension. The Quebecquoi wanted to get their money out
of France on private copying levies; the Quebecquoi did not want
to pay money to the United States for private copying levies. So
they wanted to maintain the possibility of having a discriminatory
private copying system that would grant benefits to the French, on
some weird cultural set of arguments, while denying benefits to the
United States.
The principal problem of the cultural provision, I think-and
actually, this is a thought that has kind of puzzled me for a
while-is that we have in trade these superseding considerations
called "national security," and when national security is invoked,
all bets are off. One of my big fears is that countries are going to
* Joel Kolko, Esq., Managing Editor, World Intellectual Property Report, Washington,
D.C.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1991, art. 2106, available in
LEXIS, Genfed Library, Extra File, NAFTA.
2. Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987 & Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S., H.R. DOC. No.
216, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1988), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988).
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develop "cultural exceptions" in the area of copyright. What they
will say is, "We will have a copyright law, we will have national
treatment, and we'll have everything else, but when it's a cultural
issue all bets are off and this is a superseding consideration."
Ultimately, I think, that is a nuance that is embedded in the
cultural exception. If that is picked up, it will present a problem.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This question is for the whole panel,
but particularly for the two professors. If I understand you, you
are saying that the particular shape given copyright protection is
now really trade-driven or economic-driven, and you cited Comput-
er Associates v. Altai3 as an example. I tend to see it more as a
fundamental failure of traditional copyright to deal with this evolv-
ing technology. Do you disagree with that?
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: The decision in Computer Associ-
ates correctly applies traditional copyright doctrines as they pertain
to functional works, which is all that computer program are entitled
to. The court's methodology derives from Baker v. Selden4 and is
consistent with the Supreme Court's recent decision in Feist.5 The
hard fact is that copyright law protects personal expression against
copying only, whereas innovators in the computer software field
need to protect applied scientific know-how, including technical
ideas, against both unauthorized use and reproduction by third
parties. Copyright law cannot protect the functional components
of computer programs--or their dynamic behavioral impact, where
the true value resides-and efforts to bend the copyright paradigm
to this end will either fail or end in massive overprotection. I dis-
cuss these issues at length in my paper for this Conference and in
other articles cited therein.
The inability to protect the applied know-how in computer
programs is the same problem we find in biotechnology, industrial
design, and other cutting-edge forms of innovation. That is, we are
dealing with incremental innovation bearing know-how on its face.
As my articles show, such innovation is seldom patentable because
3. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
4. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
5. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 11 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
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it fails the nonobviousness test; it achieves little or no protection
from copyright law, which cannot deal with technical results as
such; and it cannot be dealt with in trade secret law either, because
the valuable know-how is usually embodied in the product and
publicly distributed, which causes it to forfeit secrecy and become
vulnerable to rapid duplication. Sooner orlater, we must devise a
new legal paradigm to deal with applied scientific know-how as
such.
Meanwhile we are stuck with a proliferation of intermediate
regimes that are being thrown at a moving target, so to speak, with
the result that we swing from states of chronic underprotection to
states of chronic overprotection and back again. A sui generis law
to protect applied scientific know-how as such is what we need,
and I submit that this law would not operate like a classical intel-
lectual property system and that it would resolve the common prob-
lems of industrial design, biogenetic engineering, and computer
programs.
My colleagues, Pam Samuelson, Mitchell Kapor, the inventor
of Lotus 1-2-3, Randy Davis, and myself are trying to apply this
approach to computer programs.6 We hope to come out with a
major statement next year regarding the application of this theory
to the specific case of computer programs. One of our earliest
findings was, in fact, that innovators are really trying to protect the
dynamic behavioral impact of the computer program in copyright
law, which the copyright paradigm cannot legitimately allow. That
finding was introduced into the Computer Associates case because
the court called Professor Davis, of M.I.T., to be its impartial ex-
pert after the other experts confused the issues. Even before that,
scholars like Professor Goldstein and others, especially Professor
Samuelson, were saying, "The problem is that when you had the
CONTU deliberations, CONTU never called anybody who knew
anything about computer programs and never sat down to investi-
gate the problems." They said, "Well, you've got this two-dimen-
6. See Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell Kapor & J.H. Reichman, A
Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs (unpublished work in
progress).
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sional writing; it's got words here. Why can't we protect it in
copyright law?"
But, as Professor Davis said at the WIPO Symposium on Artifi-
cial Intelligence, "Software is a machine whose medium of con-
struction happens to be text." Therefore, you have a hybrid subject
matter at the very core of our economic fabric, and it's not surpris-
ing to see legal hybrids multiplying all over the place to try to deal
with this problem as it appears in other fields.
It's not such a new problem as we like to think, by the way.
The problem was originally posed by industrial design. Think
about it. An early finding of mine that has attracted some attention
in Europe is that the old problem of industrial art and the new
problem of industrial literature have a common denominator. The
difference is that we thought we could afford to allow industrial art
to flounder around out there-and we'll talk about that tomor-
row-and we see that there are many different approaches to de-
sign protection in the domestic laws. In the nineteenth century, we
ignored this problem because it was a marginal case both in intel-
lectual property law and economically. Today, industrial design
drives the products market and industrial literature drives the whole
information-based economy of the twenty-first century, which turns
on electronic information tools. 7 All our future competition is
based on this; everything is digital. Therefore, we are going to
have to learn to redimension our whole competitive universe.
So, once you recognize the magnitude of the problem, you
understand why we're going to have to rethink our whole competi-
tive structure. "Why don't we just throw copyright law at it?,"
becomes a naive question to ask. I have to tell you, a law devised
to protect Victor Hugo and Giuseppe Verdi and their grandchildren,
is a wonderful law, all about cultural policy; I love it, I work with
it ever day. But that's not the law you want to protect applications
of artificial intelligence; that's not going to do the job. It's a stop-
gap measure. We don't have other stopgap measures at the mo-
ment in this country.
7. See generally Jerome H. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools-The Outer Edge
of World Intellectual Property Law, 24 I.I.C. 446 (1993).
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Switzerland has tried one. The so-called Troller law on unfair
competition is one of the most interesting experiments that I've
seen. Quietly snuck into Article 5(c) of their new unfair competi-
tion law, it is a stopgap measure to protect new technological inno-
vation against slavish imitation for the time needed to recoup in-
vestment. There are a lot of problems with it, but it remains a very
interesting experiment at least.
So, I just want to say that we underestimated the problem be-
cause we didn't understand where the computer revolution was
leading us. Now that we begin to see the implications of digitali-
zation and information science, we must seriously rethink this prob-
lem.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: In the early 1980s, the United
States particularly promoted copyright protection on a worldwide
basis at various international fora. I'm not sure that the problem
was in our understanding of where the computer revolution was
going as in our lack of understanding what the value of high tech-
nology was, particularly in the software area. Value was really in
the functionality; what you were doing with it, what it could be
used for. That isn't what copyright was designed to address.
In that sense, you can tinker with the dimensions of copyright
but functionality is not what you're aiming at protecting through
copyright. However, for the last ten plus years, we have done the
tinkering and we now have to deal with this history. Accepting the
history of the last decade does not change the notion that we prob-
ably made a mistake back in the early 1980s when we pushed
copyright to protect information technologies.
MR. SIMON: The copyright law cases are seeking to fill the
gap. Cases like Altai tend to bring copyright back to our historical
tradition of protection. But that doesn't fill the-gap. The gap will
not be improved or diminished by keeping patent and copyright
protection for those cases that need them.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I would just like to second what Em-
* Steven J. Metalitz, Vice President and General Counsel, Information Industry
Association, Washington, D.C.
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ery said and elaborate with a footnote on it very briefly. I think it
is important to keep the balance, keep both of those sides in per-
spective. I think that there was some appreciation, even ten years
ago, that by bringing the intellectual property issues into the trade
arena, it was not an entirely unmitigated plus; there would be some
consequences as well.
I am concerned about the idea that, in the database field, as
well as in the software field, some of our court decisions suggest
that we are totally on the wrong track or we took a wrong turn ten
years ago in the way we approached copyright. Especially, Jerry
Reichman's statement that most electronically assembled databases
do not meet the standard of creativity in Feist. I don't think that
the facts bear that out in the post-Feist environment. I'm not sure
that there's much difference between the Feist standard and the
intellectual creation standard in the TRIPS Treaty. I'd be interested
in Jerry's reaction as to how much the TRIPS Treaty, in his view,
raises the level from Feist, given that under Feist virtually all com-
mercially significant databases are protected.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: If you want to talk about it seri-
ously, the problem for databases is they are often randomly sorted.
They are a randomly sorted compilation, a computer-generated
work. That is what no less than Professor Sam Ricketson has dis-
cussed in the Columbia-VLA Journal of Law and the Arts,6 and in
his view there is no place for computer-generated works under the
Berne Convention. England has tried to protect skill and labor in
copyright law, but it's the only country that still has such a low
level of creative authorship.
You just don't escape the fact that most databases are the prod-
uct of a random assortment. That's what the Supreme Court was
talking about. I don't like the way the Court constitutionalized the
requirement of a creative component in the "original work of au-
thorship" standard; I hate that. But the standard is there.
If, as Hugh Hansen points out, the United States courts follow-
6. Sam Ricketson, People or Machines: The Berne Convention and the Changing
Concept of Authorship, 16 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 8-12, 28 (1991).
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ing Feist are going to deliberately water the creativity requirement
down by piecemeal applications that don't apply it fully, then we
won't have much of a problem at the eligibility stage. I think he
was right in saying that there has been a lot of resistance to Feist.
Nevertheless, the scope of protection remains "thin" because the
Supreme Court allowed third parties freely to reuse the data com-
piled, which is the crux of the problem.
As regards "originality and creativity," I will say-and I will
leave it to Dr. Verstrynge to say more-that historically, there is
a convergence between our doctrine of originality, which we are
elevating, and the, European doctrine, which is descending. A
Dutch scholar, Professor Hugenholz, reached that same conclusion
at the Amsterdam Conference on Information Law Toward the 21st
Century in 1991 and published it. So there is less divergence than
before.
But what you don't get away from in the Berne Union-and
this has been brought up in GATT-is personality protection and
the requirement of a personal intellectual creation. And, quite
rightly, the EC Commission has recognized this problem right from
the beginning, because the Nordic countries already had their "cata-
log rule," to protect noncopyrightable compilations in a sui generis
regime. The EC Commission has now proposed a sui generis law
for noncopyrightable databases, which also addresses the scope of
protection issue.
If the EC adopts a sui generis law to protect compilations and
databases, it will take some of the downward pressure off of the
copyright standard. Only when and if the two laws are both in
place will we know for certain how much of a gap there would be
between one and the other. The size of the gap will depend on
whether courts strain to expand copyright law, notwithstanding sui
generis protection; or whether they allow copyright law to exclude
more and more borderline compilations because there is a sui gene-
ris law to take up the slack.
DR. VERSTRYNGE: I want to make one remark. Both the
Software Directive and the Database draft leave explicitly open the
fact that you can apply other methods of protection, like unfair
competition. I want to say that, at least for Europe, this problem
1993]
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doesn't exist because in the European Court of Justice we had a
case five or ten years ago, where they admitted unfair competition,
slavish imitation. So, as far as we are concerned, with the new
Software Directive, even if they fall out of it, this legislation falls
into the protection of that case. It is one of the rare cases where
the Court-not under Article 36, but under the Cassis de Dijon7
theory-admitted that slavish imitation could be stopped at the
internal border. So we have even .a possibility to capture these
things inside the EEC.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Professor Reichman, you raised really
three areas of protection: patents, trade secrets, and copyrights. In
patents, I think it's very dangerous if we drop our standard of strict
nonobviousness. And I think we should not change or have any
different standard for foreign countries. There has to be some
room for competition, and we can't be too greedy.
Second, you make a very good point on trade secrets. Trade
secret protection alone is relatively meaningless in the long range
because, as you correctly point out, there will be reverse-engineer-
ing at some point in time. So it's illusory to think that because
Japan has a new trade secret law-or any country has a new trade
secret law-that this-will be of great benefit to the United States.
It's the underlying patent law that is very important. Of course, we
will talk about why we need strong patent protection tomorrow.
Now, the question comes in the area of computer protection.
There seem to be three schools of thought. There is the
Samuelson-Reichman school, with an as-yet-unknown sui generis
protection which we are all waiting to see unveiled this fall. Then
you have Richard Stern, who has a combination of patent and ev-
erything else background, and I don't know what he has in mind,
but he has his plan.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: We are moving in the same direc-
tion.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Moving in the same direction, but in
7. Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverualtung fOr Branntwein, Case No. 120/78
[1979] E.C.R. 649.
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a different manner, I think. Then you have Arthur Miller, who
says, "Let's do some CONTU," and he takes you guys all to task.
Where do you stand vis-k-vis Stern and Miller? There seem to
be three different schools of thought.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: Now, since Stem has been moving
in the right direction, we're very happy to see that he is indepen-
dently recreating the ontology of our own three-year search. He is
a welcome entry in' this quest for a sui generis approach. We think
we have a solid theoretical structure for our approach that Stem
does not have, but we know his ideas are valid and relevant.
Miller, back in the 1970s, before 1975, was a disciple of a
famous professor at Harvard, Professor Kaplan. When Kaplan,
who opposed copyright protection of software, was being attacked,
Miller was his proteg6, and they wrote a lot of nasty things about
copyright protection of computer programs that are part of the
legislative history. In fact, Kaplan is the one who truly foresaw the
Baker v. Selden functionality problem. In 1965, Kaplan and Miller
got Congress to send the bill back to the Copyright Office, to deal
with the true Baker v. Selden problem. But the Register came back
with the idea-expression distinction in section 102(b), which is
Nimmer's revisionist view of Baker.8 When you think about it,
Baker v. Selden is really about the need to override the reproduc-
tion right if intermediate copying is the only way to reach underly-
ing, unprotectable matter, especially functional ideas. Baker v.
Selden is about a certain kind of fair use in regard to functional
works; it has nothing to do with idea-expression as such. But the
Copyright Office came back with section 102(b), and the Kaplan-
Miller objection was ignored.
Then Miller changed completely at a certain point, during the
CONTU hearings, and nobody knows why, and he hasn't changed
since. Every once in a while he comes out and says, "Copyright
is the best of all possible worlds." Why?
8. See generally J.H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific Know-
How: Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42
VAND. L. REV. 692-93, 693 n.288 (1989).
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If you think that, you ignore twenty years of experience, you
ignore what the courts are telling you, and you ignore the real
nature of this problem. It's true that the software business is going
forward. What copyright law did was to stop slavish imitation. In
Germany, this was achieved outside of copyright law, in unfair
competition law, which has protected computer programs against
slavish imitation. That wasn't very different from what we're get-
ting out of the Second Circuit after Computer Associates v. Altai.
But that isn't going to be enough to develop artificial intelligence
machines, advanced computer-generated design, all these electronic
information tools.
Slavish imitation protection will not give the investment bank-
ers enough incentive. Or take biotech-if the cure for cancer turns
out to be unpatentable because it uses technically obvious methods
and processes, are we going to get that cure for cancer? Because
it may have taken an innovative firm ten million man-hours to
figure out how to apply well-known processes to reach that particu-
lar gene and splice it with that other particular gene. But the court
will be bound by our traditional patent laws to say that's obvious.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Why?
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: Because it was a logical and clear
result conceptually for a routine engineer to make; it will be incre-
mental innovation, not what the European's call an "inventive step"
away from the prior art; and it only took the time and the skill to
develop the know-how, but time and skill are not patentable. Once
you embody know-how in the gene, in the product, you expose it
to instant reverse engineering; if I can get hold of the
biogenetically made organism that carries the solution, I can dupli-
cate that the same way I can duplicate a computer program.
So we've got to deal with these intermediate technologies that
fall outside of the patent and copyright regimes-we've got to deal
with applied scientific know-how as such.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: There is no doubt that the droit
d'auteur systems were unable in any way to accept that computer-
* Robert J. Hart, European Patent Attorney, Liverpool, England.
[Vol. 4:171
GATT AND NAFTA
generated works should fit within that sphere of protection as far
as droit d'auteur is concerned. Undoubtedly, at WIPO there was
an attitude which came out which said that a droit d'auteur-type
copyright really is not an area for computer-generated works, even
if we can't identify what they are at the moment.
I feel that we are getting nearer to being able to identify what
they are. I do feel that many of the results of using artificial intel-
ligence are in fact creating works which do need to be protected
against unauthorized reproduction and adaptation, even if those
words are inadequate to say what it is that we need to protect for.
I am very supportive towards some of the things that you have
said. But, having said that, I go very much towards Emery's ob-
servations because what we've got to have is an international sys-
tem that will protect whatever these things are, because it is no
good trying to start generating something which is not going to be
internationally accepted. I think that is really the big area that
we've got to look into and try to make decisions in internationally.
I think that there's an area there that needs to be protected, but
we've got to have it fit in within international systems because if
we don't have it fit in within international systems, then it will just
mushroom and then we'll have all sorts of difficulties set up by
various interested circles. Then we would get to a situation where
we can't ever come to an international agreement.
I'm sure that somehow things like that have got to be taken
into account, but I'm not certain that we should in any way move
away from the things that Emery is saying right at this point in
time. And I guess I'm as enthusiastic as anybody to see what
you're going to come up with in the fall.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: I think your points are interest-
ing because they show this irony that the debate you are discussing
is really a debate over what the standards of protection are or more
precisely, the scope of protection. Namely, what does it mean in
the TRIPS text to say "intellectual creation"? Who is going to be
applying that standard? Answers are set out in TRIPS.
MR. SIMON: That standard, by the way, was meant to be
nothing different than existing standards.
1993]
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PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: But that varies significantly
under national laws.
MR. SIMON: That's exactly right, and it is meant to. It is
meant to accommodate all the various systems. That doesn't mean
it's not going to be litigated and there's not going to be a fight
over it, but you're reading far, far, far, far, far too much into what
was intended by that. Nothing was intended by that.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Except that the disputes over
standards now take place in the trade arena rather than in domestic
courts.
MR. SIMON: Yes. That's important, but we don't know how
it's going to play out. That is the nuance that both of you brought
to this, and it's the correct one. It's unclear what the hybrid is
going to be. At the moment, the hybrid is a good thing. It may
turn out to be not so good. It's right that we raise the alarms, but
it's not yet right to abandon this.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: After all, as you were saying
earlier, whether we like it or not, software has become a major
trade problem. Therefore, we have to deal with it in the trade
arena. We can't ignore it. It's there.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: I don't think it's a question
today of abandonment of traditional intellectual property rights;
rather, it's a question of how are we now going to deal with some
of the second-generation issues that will crop up through the trade
agreement.
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